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I. Introduction 
The objective of the paper is to analyze how changes in raw peanut prices have been 
reflected in the prices of peanut butter, the most important product of peanut processing. 
Specifically, we are interested in the observed asymmetry of raw peanut to butter price 
transmission and in identification of its possible causes. The findings allow us to discuss 
the likely distributional effects of the changes in the producer support introduced by the 
2002 Farm Act, i.e., to examine the extent to which reduction in peanut prices caused by 
the introduction of the 2002 Farm Act may benefit the consumers of the products of 
peanut processing, the processing companies, and peanut growers.  Given the absence of 
peanut butter consumption data, the analysis relies on observed changes in the peanut 
butter prices: the presumption is that a reduction in the price of peanut butter following a 
proportionate reduction in peanut prices should indicate an increase in the consumer 
surplus.  
The issue of price transmission - the proportion of an (interim) input price change 
that is passed on to the output prices - has always been hot in agricultural economics. It is 
particularly important in the analysis of welfare effects of changes in agricultural 
policies, like elimination of farm price support programs or introduction of alternative 
support mechanisms, and in the analysis of economic effects of new technologies (e.g., 
more productive equipment or genetically modified crops that reduce producers' costs).  
Of particular importance is the issue of asymmetric manufacturer or processor price 
responses to exogenous changes in marginal (variable) input costs. In many industries, it 
has been observed that, while increases in input prices are almost instantaneously 
reflected in the output prices, input price decreases are usually followed only by delayed 
  2and partial drops in the output prices (Peltzman, 2000). In the economic theory, this 
phenomenon has been explained in terms of two major influences: possible market power 
of the manufacturers and profit maximizing inventory management. As both factors are 
important in the analysis of food processing industries, they are the most likely 
explanations of the asymmetry in question. 
The change in peanut production support policies introduced by the 2002 Farm 
Act has led to a significant drop in raw peanut prices. Under the now-eliminated peanut 
marketing quota, the quota peanuts - peanuts purchased for the edible market (e.g., for 
peanut butter and snack production) were sold at a support price of $610/ton. The Farm 
Act replaced the quota support system with the marketing loan program that, effectively, 
established a much lower price floor of $314/ton and removed quantity constraints. As a 
result, the average price of the 2002 crop dropped to $380 per short ton (38%). While we 
do not possess the most current market data, findings about the level and structure of 
price transmission in the past may suggest how the surplus generated by the price drop is 
shared between the producers and consumers.  
In spite of the vast literature on the asymmetry of price transmission (see 
Peltzman, 2000, for an extensive review), only two applied studies on peanut butter 
prices have been undertaken. Zhang et al. (1995) analyzed the effect of price transmission 
from shelled peanuts to peanut butter for the period of 1984-1992 and found that, in the 
short run, peanut butter prices responded to increases in peanut prices faster than to 
decreases. However, the pass-through effect was found to be symmetric in the long run. 
Deodhar et al. (1998) also studied the pass-through effect, but now with a focus on 
testing competitiveness of the peanut butter manufacturing industry. Their results showed 
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competitiveness in the long-term. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly review the methods 
used for testing for asymmetric price transmission and theoretical explanations that have 
been offered. Second, we present some results of empirical tests for the asymmetry of 
transmission of peanut price changes to wholesale peanut butter prices changes and from 
wholesale to retail peanut butter price changes. Then, we discuss possible causes of the 
price transmission asymmetry in the peanut markets, and well as the implications of the 
changes in the production support policies.  
 
II.  Testing Asymmetry of Price Transmission 
The issue of asymmetric price transmission has attracted much attention and 
raised a few issues in economics. The interest was spurred by both positive and 
normative aspects of the phenomenon. On the one hand, despite the fact that asymmetry 
in price transmission has been frequently observed empirically, economic theory has not 
fully incorporated it. On the other hand, economic policies also fail to account for 
consumer effects of asymmetric price transmission. 
Empirical work on finding evidence of price transmission asymmetry has focused 
mainly on the agricultural and food processing industries (see Harper and Goodwin, 
1999, for a discussion), on gasoline and fuel markets (Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert, 
1997), and on financial markets (for example, Enders and Gardner, 1998, found evidence 
of asymmetric adjustment between interest rates of different maturities). A much more 
comprehensive study of several hundred producer and consumer goods in the US 
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two-thirds of the markets, which makes asymmetric price transmission a rule rather than 
an exception.  
Perhaps the most significant problem that has prevented direct incorporation of 
asymmetric price transmission into economic theory and policies is that existing 
econometric methods used for detecting it could not clearly differentiate among the 
possible causes of this phenomenon. One should mention that price transmission 
asymmetry arguments are different from explanations of different levels, or percentages, 
of price transmission, though the two sets of arguments are related. While the latter is 
mostly cost, supply, and demand elasticity related, the former has somehow more 
sophisticated explanations. 
The two main culprits for price transmission asymmetry that have been suggested 
are abuse of market power (imperfect competition) and profit maximizing inventory 
management. The logic of the market power argument is simply that firms in a tacitly 
collusive industry earning abnormal profits tend to simultaneously increase their margins 
in response to a drop in the input costs thereby passing only a small fraction of the 
decrease on to the output prices. At the same time, collusive behavior facilitates passing 
(almost) all of the input price increase to the output price. The magnitude of such 
transmission asymmetry depends not only on the firm behavior but also on the economies 
of scale and demand and supply elasticities (McCorriston, Morgan, and Rayner, 2001). 
The differences between the long and short run transmission effects in the market power 
logic are determined by the importance of capital costs and/or capacity adjustment and on 
the time that this adjustment takes.  
  5The inventory management argument is based on dynamic models of profit 
maximizing inventory management as in Zabel (1972), Blinder (1990), and Phlips 
(1980). The general result of such models is that the presence of inventories introduces 
additional price rigidity, which is consistent with maximizing behavior: because of the 
"cushioning" effect of inventories, prices tend to move sluggishly in industries whose 
outputs (inputs) are storable, as price responses are substituted by quantity responses. 
Thus, sectors with perishable inventories are more likely to exhibit more price flexibility 
than those with easily storable stocks. 
The explanation of price transmission asymmetry based on the models of 
inventory management is akin to that of downward price rigidity. The argument is that, 
when negative inventories ("unfilled orders") are prohibited, which is quite a realistic 
assumption, there will be asymmetric price responses: prices will react more strongly to 
increases in demand than to decreases in demand. In other words, the sales (quantity) 
response is smaller when a firm has stocked out (as a result of an increase in demand or 
decrease in supply), and thus the price response must be greater, hence the asymmetry 
result. The important feature of this argument is that it does not require the assumption of 
imperfect competition. The inventory argument is more robust when applied at the macro 
level, as it is likely that the number of firms experiencing stock-outs is greater at higher 
levels of macroeconomic activity, and thus price responses to demand shocks should be 
greater there (Blinder, 1990).   
Apart from the market power and inventory management arguments, asymmetric 
price transmission has also been attributed to cost adjustment rigidities, like menu costs 
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production volume or capacity adjustment.  
Regardless of the reason behind asymmetric price transmission, several 
econometric methods have been used in testing it. Most attempts have been based on a 
variable splitting technique for detecting irreversible supply reactions originally 
developed by Wolfram (1971), and later adapted by Houck (1977) and Ward (1982). A 
different approach was used by Cramon-Taubadel (2000) who showed that an 
asymmetric error correction model (ECM) based on Granger and Lee (1989) can be more 
applicable than the Houck approach if the price data being studied are cointegrated. 
However, Harper and Goodwin (1999) used a threshold autoregressive test for unit roots 
to test for the presence of asymmetric price transmission and argued that this method has 
several advantages over the asymmetric ECM. 
  It has been argued that the latter two methods are also more useful in the presence 
of the so-called structural breaks (Cramon-Taubadel, 2000). A structural break occurs 
when events like increasing industry concentration or changes in government policy that 
affect market outcomes lead to changes in structural relationships linking prices at 
various levels of the marketing chain. This is an important attribute of the models as it 
allows avoiding model mis-specification: tests for asymmetric price transmission that are 
based on models that assume the presence of a unique and stable vertical relationship 
between prices are likely to be misleading if the assumption is false. Cramon-Taubadel 
(2000) found that the presence of structural changes in price data lead to far more 
rejections of the null hypothesis of symmetric transmission than appropriate and thus 
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attributed to other causes. 
The dataset used in testing peanut prices transmission asymmetry consists of 
monthly price data that covers a period from 1984 to 1999. The monthly data on shelled 
peanut prices come from USDA's Peanut Marketing Summary reports and the Federal 
State Market News. The monthly peanut butter prices and the prices of other peanut 
processing products are reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The software used in 
estimation is EViews. 
A starting point for testing asymmetry is to verify whether the time series possess 
unit roots, since it implies a different econometric method (cointegration approach). 
Table 1 presents the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots. As shown in the table, 
the hypothesis of unit roots is rejected in all the cases.  
Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 1/
Series Statistics
Augmented Critical
Dickey - Fuller Value (5%)
Peanut prices -3.90 -3.43
Wholesale Peanut Butter Price -3.94 -3.43
Retail Peanut Butter Price -3.62 -3.44
1/ Dickey-Fuller test with intercept, trend and 12 lags.  
  The next step is to test for asymmetry from peanut prices to wholesale peanut 
butter prices and from wholesale peanut butter prices to retail peanut butter prices. We 
ran two regressions for each case using two types of equations. The first type of equation 
considers the regression of the first difference in the downstream price in the supply 
  8chain on the first difference in the price immediately upstream in the supply chain (e.g., 
first difference in the wholesale peanut price on to the first difference in the peanut price).  
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The results are presented in table 2. 
In contrast with the results by Zhang et al. (1995) and Deodhar et al. (1998), our 
results show that the peanut price transmission effects are not symmetric in the long-term. 
However, the data show similar differences in transmission lags following increases and 
decreases in the prices of raw peanuts. Thus, it appears that asymmetric price 
transmission has manifested itself once again. 
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Table 2: Tests of Assymetric Price Transmission
Peanut Price to Wholesale Peanut Butter Price Wholesale Peanut Butter Price to Retail Peanut Butter Price
Coeff. t Sum Coeff. t Sum Coeff. t Sum Coeff. t Sum
Constant 0.22 2.75 0.04 0.73 0.18 3.11 0.00 -0.06
∆PB+ 0.09 13.32 0.09 0.09 22.89 0.24 0.32 2.78 0.32 0.16 1.50 1.38
∆PB+(-1) 0.09 21.62 0.64 5.85
∆PB+(-2) 0.04 9.84 0.11 0.97
∆PB+(-3) 0.00 0.64 0.23 1.97
∆PB+(-4) 0.00 0.93 0.30 2.43
∆PB+(-5) 0.01 1.27 0.13 1.07
∆PB+(-6) 0.00 0.30 -0.19 -1.59
∆PB- 0.09 11.23 0.09 0.10 20.58 0.11 -0.49 -1.07 -0.49 -0.54 -1.34 0.28
∆PB-(-1) -0.01 -2.25 0.04 0.10
∆PB-(-2) 0.01 2.16 1.15 2.90
∆PB-(-3) 0.00 -0.19 -0.22 -0.56
∆PB-(-4) 0.00 0.40 0.20 0.51
∆PB-(-5) 0.00 0.16 -0.52 -1.32
∆PB-(-6) 0.01 1.34 0.16 0.40
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There are both long- and short-term price transmission asymmetries observed in 
the peanut processing industry. This suggests that the dynamic inventory management 
explanation of the asymmetry is less relevant here, as the essential feature of the logic of 
the inventory argument is that the asymmetry is always temporary, i.e., the presence of 
inventories buffers supply (or demand) shocks, making their effects eventually disappear. 
Besides, the inventory argument implies an assumption of possibility of stockouts. 
Industry information that we possess does not indicate that either peanut sheller or peanut 
butter manufacturer stockouts are common. 
  The permanence of price transmission effects established by the estimation speaks 
more in favor of the market power argument. The persistence of asymmetry suggests that 
the firms in the industry have been behaving collusively over time, which shifted the 
gains from input price decreases from consumers and producers to the processors. The 
estimation methodology used in this paper does not allow separating the transmission 
effects on the consumers and on the producers. However, it is likely that sharing 
surpluses between agricultural producers and processors is relatively more dependent on 
their relative bargaining power and on the types of contractual arrangements between 
them. In the light of our findings at this stage, it is likely that, over the analyzed  time 
period, most of the producer cost reductions passed on to the processors, while cost 
increases have been mostly absorbed by the producer. 
An interesting observation can be made with regard to the vertical industry 
structure. Evidence of price transmission asymmetry, and perhaps collusive behavior, has 
been found at two levels of the marketing chain: peanut shelling and peanut butter 
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oligopsony in the peanut market, processor - butter manufacturer oligopoly-oligopsony 
situation in the market for shelled peanuts, and another oligopoly-oligopsony situation in 
the wholesale market for peanut butter. Butter manufacturers always sell their produce 
wholesale to the retail stores and do not market it themselves. While the brand names are 
manufactured by corresponding companies, store brands are usually produced by smaller 
manufacturers that do not have a brand name, which invites asymmetry explanations 
based on firm heterogeneity and differentiated goods (Dung, 1993; Anderson et al, 2001).  
Thus, the negative effects of market concentration (horizontal industry structure) 
are made even worse by the vertical industry structure, i. e.,  by the presence of 
oligopoly/oligopsony at different levels of the marketing chain. In other words, there can 
be an issue of double marginalizaton: a negative externality that arises in a successive 
(multi-stage) oligopoly (Tirole, 1988). The firms set perceived marginal revenue equal to 
marginal cost, and the marketing chain is characterized by successive markups that sum 
up to more than a single markup that an integrated industry would set, particularly when 
downstream firms do not take upstream firms' prices as given (the is, when the "arms-
length" pricing assumption is relaxed). This is likely to be the case, as the nature of the 
contracts between manufacturing and retailing sectors reflects distribution of power in a 
bilateral bargaining problem. Depending on the distribution of the bargaining power, the 
contracts may include a number of the so-called vertical restraints, termed in economic 
literature as "full-line forcing", exclusive distribution, exclusive territories, and slotting 
allowances (McCorriston, 2002). However, the impact of a specific vertical restraint 
depends on the characterization of the vertical market structure. In different structures, 
  12vertical restraints may either worsen or ameliorate the double-marginalization problem 
that characterizes successive oligopolies. Overall, the current literature suggests that 
vertical restraints arise from market power and in situations that involve information 
asymmetry (Dobson and Waterson, 1997; Kuhn, 1997).  
The contracts that involve peanuts and peanut processing products have not been 
studied extensively, and we are researching it at the moment. Overall, it appears that the 
peanut marketing chain has not been affected by the wave of mergers and acquisitions 
observed in other food industries. Theory suggests that these activities may actually be 
welfare enhancing in successive oligopoly situations. Consolidation in the peanut 
industry may be taking place in the form of binding contractual agreements between 
vertically related trading parties. For example, peanut shellers have introduced several 
types of binding forward contracts that tie up the producer stocks in under the marketing 
loan. Similarly, peanut butter manufacturers are using increasingly more binding 
contracts with the shellers.  
Unfortunately, limited availability of most recent data prevents explicit analysis 
of the effects of the significant peanut price decreases caused by the elimination of the 
peanut quota program under the 2002 Farm Act. However, our findings suggest that the 
input price decrease is not likely to be entirely passed on to the consumers: it is divided 
among all the economic agents involved, with the more powerful getting more of it.  
III.a. Explaining observed asymmetry in terms of inventory management in 
an imperfectly competitive environment. 
In this subsection, we sketch a model that tries to explain price transmission 
asymmetry in terms of a simple inventory management argument in an imperfectly 
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are required in the traditional market power models of asymmetric price transmission, 
and this might help in the interpretation of the results from the previous section. Let us 
consider a vertical processing industry that regularly purchases its main input (shelled 
peanuts) from producers and transforms it in peanut butter.  
  The idea behind the model is that, on the one hand, a peanut butter processing 
firm will pass a permanent increase in the peanut prices to the peanut butter price in order 
to maintain its purchasing power (i.e., purchase the same amount of peanuts to serve the 
usual demand). On the other hand, a permanent decrease in peanut prices is only passed 
after the stocks of previously purchased more expensive peanuts have been depleted. It 
should be noted that, in the latter case, a requirement for a firm not to reduce its price in 
the full amount of the decrease in peanut prices is to have some market power. If the firm 
is in a competitive environment, then the result may depend on the interaction with the 
other firms. If the other firms reduce their output price, then the firm will be forced also 
to reduce its price in order to avoid a decrease in the demand for its output. 
Let us call w the price of shelled peanuts at time t, and  the corresponding 
price of peanut butter at t. At  , the firm purchases enough stock to carry its business 
until period t+1 (given an expected demand). If at time period 
t t p
t w
α + t , where  , the 
price of peanuts changes and, depending on the direction of the change, the firm 
responds: 
1 < α
(a) If  t w + , a firm with some market power would not decrease its output price 
 until the current stock is depleted. Only after it is depleted, there will be an 
adjustment of the output price. In this case, we have an asymmetric response with lags.   
t w < α
α + t p
  14(b) If  t w then the firm will adjust its output price upward immediately due to 
the fact that it needs to replenish the stock of peanuts that have become more expensive. 
t w > α +
Such firm behavior produces asymmetric response with lags. 
 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Economic analysis of the input-output retail price transmission is important for at 
least two reasons: first, because it produces evidence about how changes in marginal 
costs (e.g., permanent shocks inflicted by changes in the legislation) affect consumers of 
the final product and, second, because it allows us to get a better understanding of how 
vertically integrated industries, especially food processing and manufacturing industries, 
actually operate.  
Our results and conclusions may illustrate a change in the market behavior of the 
peanut butter industry from relatively more competitive, as evidenced by the information 
up to 1992, to less competitive thereafter. In addition, this non-competitiveness may be 
linked to an increased concentration and anti-competitive behavior of the firms in the 
industry. This observation has direct welfare implications for the effects of the 2002 Farm 
Act that significantly affected peanut and oilseed production. It is also important for the 
analysis of the structure of contracts that are used by the firms in the industry.   
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